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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Civil Action No. 03-1681 (RCL)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This case comes to the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals. See Singh v. George 
Washington Univ. Sch. o f Med. & Health Scis., 508 F.3d 1097 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 4, 2007). This 
revised opinion does not modify the original judgment in the case, see Singh v. George 
Washington Univ. Sch. o f Med. & Health Scis., 439 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.); 
rather, in accordance with the Circuit’s instructions, it corrects and clarifies the reasoning that led 
to the original conclusion.
This case originates from a dispute between a former medical student, plaintiff Carolyn 
Singh, and the medical school that dismissed her from its program, defendant the George 
Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences (“GW”). Plaintiff claims that 
GW dismissed her because of her disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000) (“ADA”). Plaintiff initially named as additional defendants two 
administrators of the medical school, but this Court dismissed the complaint as to those two 
defendants in Singh v. George Wash. Univ., et al., 368 F. Supp. 2d 58, 72-73 (D.D.C. 2005)
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(Lamberth, J.). In so doing, this Court disposed of the parties’ pretrial cross-motions [21, 25] for 
summary judgment by granting and denying each in part. Id. at 73.
The parties appeared before this Court for a non-jury trial on November 21-23, 2005.
Each party presented several witnesses and a number of exhibits. At the Court’s direction, each 
party submitted Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law [62, 63] on April 5, 2006.
Based on all of the evidence presented, the Court makes the following findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and will, consistent with them, enter judgment in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiff.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Ms. Singh’s educational history reveals many academic achievements, along with
some instances of poor performance.
(a) Ms. Singh was born in Guyana, South America. (Trial Tr. 11/21/05 at 13.) 
She learned to read at age three. (Trial Tr. 11/22/05 at 187-88.) At a 
young age, she became a highly-ranked competitive chess player. (Trial 
Tr. 11/21/05 at 15.)
(b) After moving to New York, her scores on a placement test earned her a 
spot in the tenth grade at James Madison High School. (Trial. Tr.
11/21/05 at 16-17.) She graduated from high school at age sixteen. (Id. at 
17.)
(c) Throughout her educational career, Ms. Singh remembers struggling with 
classes that involved reading (id. at 13-16) and says that she “never liked 
reading” (id. at 13). She describes how she found ways to avoid the
2
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reading required in English courses, such as relying on material learned 
from class discussions, skimming the assigned books (id. at 16), or 
avoiding the course altogether (Trial Tr. 11/21/05 at 18).
(d) In addition to her perceived difficulties with reading, Ms. Singh reports 
that she typically performed more poorly on multiple-choice timed tests 
than her grades would indicate. (Id. at 19, 25, 27, 35-38.) As a result, she 
also attempted to avoid courses that involved multiple-choice tests. (Id. at 
31-34.)
2. Ms. Singh was a student at GW medical school from the fall of 2000 until the 
spring of 2003. She was a student in the decelerated program, in which the first 
year of medical school courses are taken over two years. (Trial. Tr. 11/23/05 at 
322-23.) Upon completion of the first year coursework, decelerated program 
students enter the regular Doctor of Medicine program for the remaining three 
years. (Id. at 341.)
3. To attain and remain in academic good standing, decelerated students must not 
only achieve a passing grade in their courses, but their grades must also be within 
one standard deviation from the class mean in courses of three or more credits.
(Id. at 323.)
4. Students who receive an inadequate grade in a course are at risk of academic 
dismissal. (Id. at 323.) The dean may require the student to appear before the 
Medical Student Evaluation Committee (“MSEC”). (Id. at 329.) The MSEC then 
makes a recommendation to the dean as to whether the student should be
3
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dismissed at that time. (Trial Tr. 11/23/05 at 329.) Once a student has been 
placed at risk of academic dismissal, he or she remains in that posture, regardless 
of whether or how the MSEC took action. (Id. at 336.)
5. Ms. Singh struggled academically at the school. (Id. at 398.) In particular, she 
performed poorly on some of the multiple-choice timed exams used to assess 
students’ progress in many courses.
(a) Plaintiff failed one of the two courses she took in her first semester, Fall 
2000. (Trial Tr. 11/21/05 at 36.) The failing grade, in Cells & Tissues, 
was based solely on her performance on a multiple-choice exam. In the 
spring 2001 semester, plaintiff passed both courses in which she was 
enrolled, but her grade in one of them fell below the standard deviation 
requirement. (Id. at 91.) Although falling below the standard deviation 
placed Ms. Singh at risk of academic dismissal, the dean did not require 
her to appear before the MSEC. (Trial Tr. 11/23/05 at 333-34.) She was, 
however, required to retake, over the summer, the course she failed in the 
fall 2000 semester. (Id. at 334.)
(b) In the fall 2001 semester, Ms. Singh enrolled in two courses. (Trial Tr. 
11/21/05 at 92.) She failed one of them and fell below the standard 
deviation in the other. (Id.) Because each event placed her at risk of 
academic dismissal, she was required to appear before the MSEC. (Trial 
Tr. 11/23/05 at 336.) Ms. Singh told the MSEC that she failed the course 
because of errors in marking her answer sheet. (Trial Tr. 11/21/05 at 93.)
4
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She also said that the September 11 terrorist attacks had adversely affected 
her performance. (Id.) The MSEC’s recommendation, in which Dr. John 
Williams, then the dean of the medical school, concurred, was that 
plaintiff remain in the program provided that she retake the failed course 
over the summer. (Id. at 94.)
(c) Plaintiff passed the two courses she took in Spring 2002, but she fell 
below the standard deviation requirement in one. (Id.) Although that 
placed her at risk of academic dismissal, she was not required to appear 
before the MSEC. (Id. at 95.)
(d) In the Fall 2002 semester, two years after plaintiff entered GW, she began 
to take the regular medical school courseload. (Trial Tr. 11/23/05 at 340­
41.) In addition to five medical school courses, Ms. Singh enrolled in a 
two-credit undergraduate piano course. (Trial Tr. 11/21/05 at 95-97.) She 
failed one of her courses and received a conditional grade in another. (Id. 
at 97, 99.) As that placed her at risk of academic dismissal, she appeared 
before the MSEC on January 16, 2003. (Id. at 99.) The MSEC 
recommended that Ms. Singh be dismissed for academic reasons. (Id. at 
101.)
6. Throughout her struggles in medical school, Ms. Singh received advice and
consultation from numerous sources on how she might improve her performance.
(a) Rhonda M. Goldberg, the Associate Dean for Student Affairs, suggested to 
Ms. Singh that she should reduce her involvement in extracurricular
5
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activities. (Trial Tr. 11/23/05 at 346, 360-63.)
(b) Upon the advice of Associate Dean Goldberg (id. at 337-38), Ms. Singh 
visited the University’s Counseling Center, where she completed a self­
assessment to identify areas for improvement (id. at 372). Based on the 
results, plaintiff was referred to self-help materials and handouts. (Id. at 
377-78.) The counseling center encouraged Ms. Singh to return to discuss 
her progress, and twice attempted to follow up with her. (Id.) Plaintiff, 
however, never responded or returned to the center. (Trial Tr. 11/23/05 at 
378.)
(c) Ms. Singh told the associate director of the counseling center, Dr. Davis, 
that she often listened to—and sang along with—music while studying, 
even though she knew it interfered with her retention of the material. (Id. 
at 368.)
(d) Ms. Singh also told Dr. Davis that she was involved in a number of 
extracurricular activities. (Id. at 369-70.)
(e) After being called before the MSEC in January 2003, Ms. Singh began to 
suspect that she might have a learning disability, and visited the 
University’s center for disability support services. (Trial Tr. 11/21/05 at 
43.) The center referred her to several specialists who could test her for 
disabilities. (Id. at 44.)
7. At Dean Williams’ request, Ms. Singh met with him on February 11, 2003. (Trial
Tr. 11/21/05 at 101; Trial Tr. 11/23/05 at 393-94.) At the meeting, he
6
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com m unicated his decision to dism iss her from  the program . (Trial Tr. 11/23/05 
at 395-96, 398.) P la in tiff advised the D ean that she w as aw aiting the results o f  
disability  testing, bu t D ean W illiam s told her that the results w ould  not affect his 
decision. (Id. at 395-96.)
8. O n February 4, 5, 10 and 19, M s. Singh m et w ith  Dr. A nne C. N ew m an for testing 
to determ ine w hether she had any learning disabilities. (P l.’s Tr. Ex. 1.)
(a) Dr. N ew m an is a clinical psychologist. She devotes approxim ately h a lf  o f  
her caseload to diagnosing and treating young adults w ith  learning 
disabilities. (Trial Tr. 11/22/05 at 145.)
(b) Dr. N ew m an interview ed and tested plaintiff. W hile she reported that Ms. 
Singh w as distressed about her academ ic troubles, Dr. N ew m an did not 
conclude that p la in tiff w as so depressed that her test results w ould  be 
affected. (Id. at 150, 205-06.)
(c) U pon com pletion o f  p laintiff’s testing, Dr. N ew m an prepared a report 
sum m arizing her findings. H er rev ised1 report concluded that M s. Singh 
suffered from  two learning disabilities: reading disorder (dyslexia), and a 
m ild  d isorder o f  processing speed. (P l.’s Tr. Ex.1.)
(d) B ased on the learning disabilities Dr. N ew m an identified, she 
recom m ended that p la in tiff receive a num ber o f  accom m odations: double
Dr. Newman initially diagnosed plaintiff with three disabilities: reading disorder (dyslexia), mild disorder 
of processing speed and a disorder of phonological awareness. (Pl.’s Tr. Ex. 1.) Subsequently, however, she 
discovered an error in her scoring, and upon correction, concluded that plaintiff suffered from only two of the three 
disabilities initially diagnosed: dyslexia and the processing speed disorder. (Trial Tr. 11/22/05 at 152-53, 165-66, 
192.)
7
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tim e on exam inations, use o f  a reader for exam s to fill in  answ er sheets on 
tests, tape recordings o f  lectures, access to professors’ or students’ notes, 
and use o f  a laptop for essay exams. (Trial Tr.11/22/05 at 176-77.)
(e) Dr. N ew m an explained that M s. S ingh’s disorders affected her test-taking 
ability because they caused p lain tiff to read m ore slow ly and w ith  great 
effort. (Id. at 192, 446.) These sym ptom s m anifested them selves m ore 
prom inently  on m ultiple choice tests because o f  the tim e pressure and the 
lack o f  context provided in  the test questions. (Id. at 156.)
9. D ean W illiam s received Dr. N ew m an’s report on or about February 26. (Trial Tr. 
11/23/05 at 402.) He concedes that, w hile he did read it, it had no effect on his 
decision to dism iss p la in tiff  for academ ic reasons. (Id. at 404.) He w rote p la in tiff 
a letter dated M arch 5, 2003, dism issing her from  the school.2 (Id. at 399.)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Legal Standard
P lain tiff claim s that G W ’s failure to offer reasonable accom m odations before dism issing
her constitutes discrim ination in  v iolation o f  § 12182(a) o f  the A D A . That section provides:
N o individual shall be discrim inated against on the basis o f  disability 
in  the full and equal enjoym ent o f  the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, o r accom m odations o f  any place o f  public 
accom m odation by  any person w ho owns, leases (or leases to), or 
operates a place o f  public accom m odation.
2This Court already found that the actual dismissal of plaintiff occurred when the letter was sent. Singh, 
368 F. Supp. 2d at 70. According to GW’s own regulations, any decision communicated orally cannot be deemed an 
official dismissal. Id. Accordingly, this Court already determined that plaintiff’s request for accommodations— 
because it was received before Dean Williams’ letter was sent—was timely. Id. Accordingly, as to the obligation to 
provide reasonable accommodations, it is irrelevant whether Dean Williams communicated to plaintiff at the meeting 
that his decision was final.
8
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42 U .S.C . § 12182(a).
A s this Court previously  noted, Singh, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 62, to establish a violation o f  
this provision, p la in tiff m ust dem onstrate “(1) that she has a disability; (2) that she is otherw ise 
qualified for the benefit in  question; and (3) that she w as excluded from  the benefit due to 
discrim ination because o f  the disability.” Kaltenberger v. Ohio College o f Podiatric Med., 162 
F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 1998); cf. Ferrell v. Howard Univ., Civ. A. N o. 98-1009, 1999 W L 
1581759, at *3 (D .D.C. 1999), aff’d, 254 F .3d 315 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
This Court review s the evidence under a preponderance standard. Flemmings v. Howard 
Univ., 198 F.3d 857, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1999). W hen this C ourt considered the parties’ sum m ary 
judgm ent m otions, it resolved the dispute as to two o f  the three factors. First, it held  that 
“ [p la in ti f f ’s undisputed evidence show s that she is otherw ise qualified to be a m edical student” 
at GW . Id. at 18. Second, it determ ined that p la in tiff could not claim  that G W  had  discrim inated 
against her by  dism issing her because o f  her disability. Rather, this Court held  that p laintiff’ s 
only claim  that she had been  discrim inated against w as based on G W ’s failure to provide 
accom m odations3 to her once they learned o f  her disability. Id. at 19-21. In so ruling, this Court 
held  that p la in tiff’s request for accom m odations w as tim ely, and that the “second chance” 
doctrine did no t defeat her claims. Id. at 21.
3As this Court previously explained, Singh, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 69-70, discrimination occurs under the 
ADA’s accommodation clause when a defendant fails
to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such 
modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can 
demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature 
of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
9
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In light of the foregoing, the only issue remaining for this Court to determine is the 
existence and nature of the disability itself. Indeed, this Court previously noted that while 
plaintiff had demonstrated (sufficient to withstand summary judgment) that she had some kind of 
impairment, whether it was a disability for purposes of the ADA had not been established.
Singh, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 63. To show that she has a disability for purposes of the ADA, 
plaintiff must prove that “(1) [s]he suffers from an impairment; (2) the impairment limits an 
activity that constitutes a major life activity under the Act; and (3) the limitation is substantial.” 
Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing § 12102(2)(A) of the ADA 
and construing its language that a protected disability is “a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual”). The Court 
already held that plaintiff had an impairment of some sort, whether it be a learning disability, as 
plaintiff contends, or depression, as defendant believes. Singh, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 63. 
Accordingly, the remainder of these Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law shall be limited to 
discussing the only remaining issue: whether plaintiff’s impairment substantially limits a major 
life activity. If it does so, then it is a disability under the ADA.
II. Analysis
Based on the evidence presented at trial, this Court does not find that plaintiff has a 
disability as defined by the ADA and case law. This conclusion is compelled by the academic 
success she has enjoyed throughout her life, including her strength from a very young age in 
areas that require reading and comprehension under time pressure, such as reading and general 
coursework. Had she the ADA-defined disability that she claims to have, her achievement 
should have been more consistently limited. Plaintiff was a student in competitive educational
10
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environm ents— she took a com petitive courseload o f  college preparatory courses at a top high 
school, and an even m ore com petitive courseload o f  pre-m edical classes at a top undergraduate 
institution— and perform ed extrem ely w ell in alm ost every subject. W hile this C ourt accepts that 
a reading disability could affect plaintiff’ s ability to com plete tim e-pressured m ultiple choice 
exam s, it does not find that her enorm ous success in  other reading and com prehension 
tasks— undoubtedly  som e o f  them  tim ed— is consistent w ith  a reading disorder w hich prim arily  
m anifests itse lf  in  lim iting her reading speed. Again, for plaintiff’ s im pairm ent to constitute a 
disability under the A D A , it m ust resu lt in  substantial lim itation o f  a m ajor life activity. P lain tiff 
has not established such substantial lim itation. To the contrary, p la in tiff  appears quite able to 
succeed in  the m ajor life activity o f  learning.
A. The Relevant “Major Life Activity” is “Learning.”
For p la in tiff  to prevail, she m ust prove that she is substantially lim ited, com pared to the 
average person,4 in  the m ajor life activity  o f  learning. It w ould  not be enough to prove that she is 
substantially  lim ited in  som e related  sub-activity, such as test-taking. Substantial lim itation o f  a 
sub-activity is only relevant to the extent that it lim its the m ajor life activity  o f  learning in 
general.5 P la in tiff claim s that she suffers from  som e lim itation in  her ability to take tim e-lim ited
4The Court of Appeals noted that this Court, in its earlier opinion denying summary judgment, set forth the 
wrong standard for assessing whether plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of learning. This 
Court held that “an ADA plaintiff can be substantially limited in the major life activity of learning based on 
comparisons of her success to others o f  comparable age and educational background .” 368 F. Supp. 2d at 67 
(emphasis added). That holding was an extension of the EEOC’s regulations regarding the major life activity of 
“working.” The Court of Appeals’ opinion disapproved of this extension. 508 F.3d at 1100-04. The proper 
standard for the major life activity of “learning,” as reflected in the accompanying text, assesses whether plaintiff is 
substantially limited compared to the average perso n . However, this standard is not integral to the rest of this 
opinion because, as explained below, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any such limitation is the result of her 
impairment.
5This distinction reflects the clarification provided by the Court of Appeals. 508 F.3d at 1104.
11
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tests. H ow ever, this Court need  not decide w hether this lim itation am ounts to a substantial 
lim itation in  the m ajor life activity o f  learning because p la in tiff  has not show n that her lim itation 
is a result of her im pairm ent (w hether a learning disability or depression).
B. There Are Numerous Possible Reasons for Plaintiff’s Claimed Test-Taking Limitation.
A ssum ing that plaintiff’ s test-taking lim itation is genuine, there are m any reasons aside 
from  plaintiff’ s im pairm ent that m ight explain w hy p lain tiff has done relatively poorly  on 
extrem ely tim e-lim ited tests. Perhaps she feels undue pressure that m akes it d ifficult to 
concentrate on com plex concepts.6 Perhaps she finds herse lf unable to pay attention to detail and 
avoid m aking errors in  m arking her answ er sheet. Perhaps her involvem ent in extra-curricular 
activities prevented her from  dedicating sufficient tim e and energy to her studies.7 Perhaps she 
does not study w ell,8 and sim ply does not know  the m aterial, bu t is better able to conceal that fact 
in  other testing form ats. M s. Singh even testified that she learned how  to get partial credit for 
books that she had not read by  sim ply repeating things she had learned in  the class discussion.
6 Such anxiety would not be surprising, given plaintiff’s strong desire to be a medical doctor and her 
relative unfamiliarity with timed multiple-choice tests. Since she claims to have avoided such tests throughout 
college and to some extent high school, she may lack practice with them relative to her peers. One’s performance on 
tests certainly requires skills and practice typically gained by familiarity with the test format itself. Similarly, 
students may have difficulty adjusting to the practice in medical school of being assessed for an entire term of 
material by one test lasting a few hours. Although courts must review schools’ compliance with the law requiring 
them to make accommodations for students with disabilities, the format in which the school chooses to assess its 
students is well within the school’s discretion. Indeed, certain testing formats may be chosen for their value in 
evaluating students not only on substantive grasp of the material, but also on their ability to perform well under 
pressure.
7
The record is replete with testimony of Ms. Singh’s extracurricular involvement and the number of people 
who suggested that she curtail or eliminate those activities in light of her academic difficulties. (Trial Tr. 11/21/05 at 
86-88, 110-11, 123; Trial Tr. 11/22/05 at 177-78, 200; Trial Tr. 11/23/05 at 346, 360-63, 368-69, 400, 465-66.)
8
As noted supra, plaintiff admits that she listened to and sang along to music while studying. Studying 
with such distractions might well cause one to perform poorly on a test of one’s knowledge of the material. Also, it 
would not be surprising if study practices that were sufficient to carry plaintiff through less competitive environments 
(such as high school and college as compared to medical school) failed to carry plaintiff through the rigors of 
medical school.
12
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(Trial Tr. 11/21/05 at 16.) Perhaps those sam e skills w orked for her on other testing form ats 
except tim ed m ultiple choice, w hich has no concept o f  partial credit.
To the extent p la in tiff  has dem onstrated any pattern o f  her perform ance on m ultiple- 
choice tests as com pared to other testing form ats, any num ber o f  these or other factors m ay 
explain that discrepancy. W hile the preponderance standard does not require p lain tiff to rule out 
every other possible explanation, she m ust dem onstrate that her explanation is m ore likely than 
not true. As m any other explanations rem ain  plausible, this Court is no t persuaded that she has a 
disability under the A D A  (i.e., an im pairm ent that substantially  lim its her ability to learn). The 
testim ony o f  plaintiff’ s expert, Dr. N ew m an, also fails to establish the requisite causal link. Dr. 
N ew m an diagnosed p la in tiff  as suffering from  a learning disability. Dr. N ew m an’s testim ony is 
unpersuasive because o f  her sparse experience in  the diagnosis and treatm ent o f  learning 
disabilities.9 The Court also notes that a m ere diagnosis o f  a learning disability— such as Dr. 
N ew m an’s diagnosis o f  p lain tiff10— does not establish “disability” under the A D A  absent 
sufficient corroborative evidence from  the pa tien t’s ow n experiences. See A lb ertso n ’s, Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999). A s is described below , plaintiff’ s spotty, anecdotal
9
The record reflects that it is only recently that her practice has been devoted to any significant degree to 
diagnosing learning disabilities, and even now it does not comprise more than half of her caseload. (Trial Tr. 
11/22/05 at 147.)
10 It should also be noted that there is some question as to the legitimacy of the data on which the diagnosis 
is based. Plaintiff’s performance on Dr. Newman’s tests may have been affected by anxiety about her impending 
dismissal from medical school because it would deny her lifelong dream of becoming a doctor. There is ample 
evidence that Ms. Singh was upset about her academic performance in medical school as well as at least one other 
event, the September 11 terrorist attacks. (Trial Tr. 11/21/05 at 93-94, 101; Trial Tr. 11/22/05 at 191, 305-07; Trial 
Tr. 11/23/05 at 382-83, 405, 431-32, 471.) While this Court declines to make a finding as to her mental condition, it 
does find that the evidence is sufficient to cast doubt on the accuracy of the test results.
13
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corroborative evidence does not suffice.11
C. Plaintiff’s Own Experience Does Not Demonstrate Substantial Limitation in Test-Taking,
Let Alone Limitation in Learning in General.
Plaintiff’ s ow n experience is replete w ith  academ ic successes. She perform ed extrem ely 
w ell in h igh school and college. W hile she claim s that she consistently  perform s m uch low er on 
m ultiple-choice tests than on other types o f  assessm ents, this C ourt does not find that she 
presented sufficient evidence to support that claim. P laintiff’ s evidence o f  the claim ed 
discrepancy is overw helm ingly anecdotal and based solely on her m em ory o f  events that occurred 
years prior. M s. Singh describes a sm all num ber o f  tests and results, bu t does not offer data 
sufficient to establish a consistent pattern  o f  perform ance over the years o f  her form al education. 
I f  she has an im pairm ent that substantially  interferes even w ith  test-taking, m ultiple-choice or 
otherwise, this C ourt w ould  expect such interference to consistently appear throughout sim ilar 
academ ic environm ents. H er recent failures in  m edical school, and the relatively  poor 
perform ance on som e tests p rio r to m edical school, have not been show n to be the result o f  her 
im pairm ent.12
* * *
11The Court of Appeals noted ambiguity in this Court’s original discussion of Dr. Newman’s testimony. In 
particular, the Court of Appeals was concerned that (1) it was unclear whether this Court believed that plaintiff did in 
fact have a learning disability and (2) the discussion confused the elements of “limitation” and “impairment.” 508 
F.3d at 1107. As for (1), this modified discussion should make clear that the Court takes no position on whether 
plaintiff in fact had a learning disability; that issue is extraneous considering that (a) plaintiff established no 
consistent substantial limitation and (b) plaintiff did not establish that any limitation was the result of her 
impairment. As for (2), this second version is more precise in its use of the terms “limitation” and “impairment.”
12The Court of Appeals noted that this Court’s original opinion, in concluding that plaintiff had not 
demonstrated substantial limitation, interpreted the testimony of the defense expert, Dr. Ostrander, in a manner not 
compelled by the testimony itself. Upon further reflection, this Court agrees. Because that interpretation of Dr. 
Ostrander’s testimony was not an indispensable element of the Court’s analysis, it has been omitted.
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In light of all the evidence, this Court finds that there are many other factors that could 
have limited plaintiff’s ability to perform well on tests—some of which were the result of 
plaintiff’s own choices and study habits. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that her low scores 
on certain tests were the result of a learning disability. Thus, those low scores are not sufficient 
to convince this Court that she has a disability as defined by the ADA. Similarly, considering all 
of the evidence plaintiff offered, taken together, and in light of defendant’s evidence, this Court 
finds that plaintiff fails to establish by a preponderance that she suffers from a disability 
cognizable under the ADA. Accordingly, she is not entitled to accommodations and defendant 
cannot be held to have violated the ADA by failing to provide her with accommodations.
As a final note, the Court would like to caution defendant that, as an educational 
institution, it is obligated to provide reasonable accommodations to students who demonstrate 
that they are entitled to them under the ADA. Defendant’s practice of dismissing a student after 
receiving documentation of the student’s disability—and without even considering whether the 
disability exists—is imprudent given the possibility that the student actually does have a 
disability under the ADA. If the request for reasonable accommodations is received prior to the 
official dismissal, as it was in this case, defendant must consider it before issuing its final 
decision whether to dismiss the student. This is necessary not only so that defendant can avoid 
being held liable in a lawsuit where a plaintiff prevails, but also because defendant ought to be 
concerned about whether students truly have learning disabilities. A well-regarded institution of 
higher learning, such as George Washington University, should be committed to the success of 
all its students, and surely that entails a sincere evaluation of their abilities and needs before 
issuing a decision to dismiss them.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, judgment consistent with these findings of fact and 
conclusions of law shall be entered for defendant.
A separate judgment shall issue this date.
Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge, February 18, 2009.
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